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‘Listening’ to the Neanderthals in William Golding’s The Inheritors: A 
Sociopragmatic Approach to Fictional Dialogue1 
Susan Mandala 
Abstract 
In their work on William Golding’s fiction, Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor (1967) claim that 
The Inheritors, more concerned with matters of mythic significance, forfeited “most of the 
possibilities of the dialogue” (71).  While in-depth treatments of language in Golding’s The 
Inheritors have since been offered (Halliday 1971; Hoover 1999; Clark 2009), the 
“possibilities of the dialogue,” in particular the conversational register of the Neanderthal 
characters, remain largely neglected.  In this sociopragmatic re-reading of The Inheritors, I 
employ theory of mind and intentionality (as outlined in Dunbar 2004) as analytical tools in 
order to ‘listen’ more closely to the Neanderthals in Golding’s text.   Paying particular 
attention to these characters as they express their religious beliefs, engage in storytelling, and 
work through interpersonal conflicts, I argue that readers are invited to infer that the 
Neanderthal characters are themselves inferring beings, and further demonstrate that this 
interpretation has implications not only for how individuals approach the novel, but for the 
way The Inheritors as a cultural text can be understood to participate in discursively 
mediating our relationship with the figure of the Neanderthal.2 
Key Words: The Inheritors, Neanderthal, sociopragmatic, pragmatic stylistics, theory of 
mind, dialogic, intentionality 
1 Introduction 
                                                 
1 This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-
profit sectors. 
2 A version of this paper was delivered to the Pragmatic Literary Stylistics Special Interest Group at the 2015 
Poetics and Linguistics Association (PALA) conference Creative Style (University of Kent, Canterbury).  I 
would like to thank the convenors of the Special Interest Group, Billy Clark and Siobhan Chapman, for the 
opportunity to give the paper and the participants for their valuable feedback.  I would also like to extend my 
thanks to the anonymous reviewers of this paper, although of course any weaknesses or errors remain my own.  
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This paper offers an analysis of William Golding’s The Inheritors (1955), an 
“imaginative exploration” (Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 1967: 68) of the human/Neanderthal 
encounter as it might have happened some 30,000-40,000 years ago when the direct ancestors 
of modern humans arrived on the Eurasian landmass.  The text presents eight Neanderthal 
characters, an elderly male (Mal), an elderly female (“the old woman”), two adult males (Lok 
and Ha), two adult females (Fa and Nil), and two children (a youngster, Liku, and an infant). 
In Golding’s vision of the meeting between “the people” (as the Neanderthals call 
themselves) and the modern humans nearly all of the Neanderthals, gentle and rather 
harmless on the whole, are slaughtered by the invading humans.  Of the exceptions, only the 
elderly patriarch figure Mal dies of natural causes.  The infant is kidnapped and Lok, the sole 
survivor, returns to their ancestral cave and lays himself down to die, overwhelmed by grief.   
2 Previous research on The Inheritors  
Studies on The Inheritors (1955) are many and varied, encompassing divergent 
approaches and concerns.  The novel has been evaluated for its engagement with the 
scientific record (DePaolo 2000), lauded as “a work of rare literary merit” (Carroll 2004: 
162), employed as data in tests of Darwinian literary theory (Carroll 2004) and functional 
grammar (Halliday 1971), chosen for stylistic analysis (Black 1993; Nelson 1986; Halliday 
1971; Adriaens 1970), analysed in Freudian terms (Sugimura 2002), read as a re-telling of the 
biblical Eden story (Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 1967: 91-93; Clark 2009: 187), explored 
for its relationship to fantasy literature (Timmons 1996), claimed as science fiction (Elsbree 
1999; Walker 1981) and, more recently, defined as one of the classic texts in the emerging 
genre of prehistoric fiction (Ruddick 2009: 76).  
As divergent and wide-ranging as this body of work at first appears to be, a salient 
theme running through much of it is that of cognition and a frequent conclusion is that the 
Neanderthal characters exhibit a number of cognitive deficits that leave them unable to cope 
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when the modern human characters arrive. While it is conceded that they may be “morally 
superior” (Hoover 1999: 52) in many ways – they are ‘unfallen’ (Kinkead-Weekes and 
Gregor and 1967: 69; Clark 2009: 187); socially harmonious (Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 
1967: 73-75; Walker 1981: 298-299; Hoover 1999: 5); invest their environment with life and 
respect that life (Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 1967: 72); and believe in a benign Mother 
Goddess (Hoover 1999: 52) – many accounts are also quick to claim that their cognitive skills 
lag behind those of the modern human characters, particularly in the areas of logical 
deduction, abstract thought, imagination, complex planning,  and innovation (DePaolo 2000: 
429; Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 1967: 67; Hackett and Dennell 2003: 823; Walker 1981: 
300; Halliday 1971: 350; Black 199).  According to such sources, the Neanderthal characters 
are more animal than human in “their appearance and low level of evolution” (Hackett and 
Dennell 2003: 818) and depend on their physical senses for information about their world, 
only infrequently employing reflection or analysis (Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 1967: 70; 
Black 1993: 43, 45; Nelson 1986: 307; Walker 1981: 300; Adriaens 1970: 21).  And while 
the text makes it “easy to believe that Neanderthal man had language” (Nelson 1986: 307), 
that language as it is represented in The Inheritors differs systematically from the language of 
the human characters and is frequently characterised as nascent in its development (Kinkead-
Weekes and Gregor 1967: 72; Hackett and Dennell 2003: 819; Black 1993: 41; Nelson 1986: 
307), lexically restricted (Black 1993); morpho-syntactically simple (Halliday 1971: 349, 
351-353), dependent on gesture (Adriaens 1970: 27), only a poor tool for thought at best 
(Black 1993: 45), and perhaps “only one stage beyond expressive noises” (Kinkead-Weekes 
and Gregor 1967: 72).  Log, for example, can mean fallen tree, bridge, or canoe (Black 1993: 
41, examples hers), and the ears on a tree are for the Neanderthals literal ears, not a 
metaphoric description of the fungi growing on the bark (Sugimura 2002: 281; Black 1993: 
45).  Other characterisations of their language include a tendency to cast inanimate objects 
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and body parts as such as stick or nose subjects (Halliday 1971: 349; Adriaens 1970: 19); the 
over-use of intransitive verbs  (Halliday 1971: 349); a preference for expressing perceptions 
as noun phrases (the tightness of his skin) rather than actions (His skin felt tight) (Adriaens 
1970: 23, examples his), and a limited use of instrumental expressions such as by means of a 
weapon (Nelson 1986).  Halliday’s (1971) conclusion on the language of the Neanderthal 
characters, while specific to his work, set the tone for much of the subsequent linguistic work 
on the text and can be taken to summarise the consensus view. 
The picture is one in which the people act, but they do not act on things; they move, but they move 
 only themselves, not other objects [. . .] [T]he scene is one of constant movement, but movement 
 which is as much inanimate as human and in which only the mover is affected – nothing else changes.  
 The syntactic tension expresses this combination of activity and helplessness (Halliday 1971: 349).    
Given the preceding account, we might conclude that the cognitive deficit reading of the 
Neanderthals in The Inheritors has robust support in the critical literature.  Curiously, 
however, this very same literature indicates that this thesis may be difficult to sustain.  Many 
studies, for example, instance scenes where the Neanderthal characters engage in complex 
planning, make logical deductions, and show an awareness of cause and effect, but then seem 
to sidestep the issue, explaining away evidence contrary to their thesis rather than confronting 
it.  It is acknowledged, for example, that the Neanderthal characters do eventually develop 
some of the higher cognitive abilities, but too little and too late to give them any advantage 
(Elsbree 1999: 234; Walker 1981, 303; Sugimura 2002: 281; Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 
1967: 87, 100, 104; Black 1993; 45, 37).  In other cases, it is conceded that Lok and his 
people are represented with higher cognitive abilities, but only in a very limited form 
(Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 1967: 73; Hackett and Dennell 2003: 822), and even this is 
stifled by their fierce resistance to change (Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 1967: 63; Walker 
1981: 303).   
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So what are we to make of this often held but difficult to maintain view that 
characterises much of the previous work on The Inheritors (1955)?  Applying Stamou’s 
(2011: 2014) work on the way “mass cultural texts” (2011: 329) represent sociolinguistic 
variety provides some useful avenues for answering this question.  In a review of how such 
representations tend to be analysed and interpreted, Stamou (2014) finds that the research 
falls largely into two broad camps, variationist and constructionist (122).  Analyses adopting 
the variationist stance, as Stamou (2014) explains, tended to treat sociolinguistic variation in 
a fairly “static” way (122).  According to this view, representations of linguistic difference 
work by reflecting pre-existing and relatively fixed sets of social categories and meanings 
(Stamou 2014: 122).  Analyses falling into the constructionist paradigm, by contrast, tended 
to view linguistic variation as a communicative “resource” (Stamou 2014: 122) available to 
speakers involved in “a meaning making process” (122). When we apply this distinction to 
the research record on The Inheritors, we find that much of the previous work on the 
language of the text fits into Stamou’s (2014) variationist paradigm.  Where linguistic 
difference was discerned, it was nearly always considered to indicate deficit and the “ready-
made social meaning” (Stamou 2014: 122) thereby reflected and reinforced is what can be 
called the discourse of human ascendency.3  According to this view the Neanderthal 
characters, with their “limited analytic abilities” (Black 1993: 45), were not as linguistically 
or cognitively advanced as the modern human characters and so the latter “triumphed” 
(Hackett and Dennell 2003: 822). Confronted with characters who were difficult to 
understand, the prevailing critical assumption seems to have been that they were failing at 
“meaning making” (Stamou 2014: 122). 
It is only in more recent work that we tend to find more constructionist readings of 
The Inheritors, readings that are willing to explore what previous studies tried to explain 
                                                 
3 The literature on The Inheritors is apparently not alone in this tendency. As Hackett and Dennell (2003) have 
noted, many scientific and fictional accounts of human evolution share the same basic structure and elements as 
fairy tales, with humans emerging as triumphant after overcoming a series of obstacles.  
6 
 
away, the possibility that morpho-syntactic simplicity may not indicate primitive and limited 
modes of thought.4  Hoover (1999), for example, challenges many of Halliday’s (1971) 
claims in a more nuanced exploration of transitivity.  While he notes that transitive verbs are 
sometimes absent, he points out that this can often be linked to the topic at hand.  In the scene 
where the Neanderthal characters are resting after a meal, for example, he points out that 
intransitive verbs certainly do occur, but as a natural consequence of the topic (Liku’s head 
nodded; the bubbles rose busily, 62), not because the people are helpless or ignorant of cause 
and effect (Hoover 1999: 47).  In addition, Hoover (1999) suggests that when transitivity 
choices do seem to co-occur with difficulties in comprehension, poverty of cognition may not 
be the best explanation.  In the well-cited scene where Lok fails to understand that one of the 
modern human characters is aiming a weapon at him, Hoover (1999) agrees that intransitive 
verbs are noticeable, but his conclusion is not that Lok is represented as failing to grasp cause 
and effect or lacking the ability to see himself as an active agent (41, 46).  Instead, he points 
to a number of contrasting instances where the people are engaging in activities that are a 
normal part of their daily lives, and notes that transitive verbs in such scenes occur in 
abundance (Hoover 1999: 50).  When Lok and Fa are butchering a deer carcass and fighting 
off hyenas interested in the same kill, for example, we find items such as Lok brandished his 
thorn bush (53)and Fa seized a foreleg (53) (examples also noted in Hoover 1999: 50). As 
Hoover (1999) points out, there is no failure of cognition or agency here.  The Neanderthals 
are represented as planning their attack, understanding their actions, understanding that their 
actions will have effects, and intending those effects.  In such scenes they are not ineffectual 
                                                 
4 It could be argued that Stanley Fish’s comments on The Inheritors in his 1973 paper ‘What is Stylistics and 
Why are People Saying Such Terrible Things About It?’ constitutes an example of this kind of exploration.  In 
his now famous response to Halliday (1971), he points out that his analysis does not necessarily motivate a 
Darwinian reading.  It could, he says, just as easily indicate an Edenic interpretation “in which the language of 
‘the people’ reflects (or embodies or enshrines) a lost harmony between man and an animate nature’ 
(1973/1996: 102-103). While Fish’s comments pose interesting questions about the text and its interpretation, he 
does not propose them in a considered and detailed analysis dedicated to the novel itself; rather, his primary aim 
is a robust critique of formalist stylistics and Halliday’s analysis is just one of his examples.   
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and unaware, but ‘competent, powerful, efficient’ (1999: 50) and Hoover (1999: 46, 49) 
concludes that when Lok encounters the modern human characters it is them – their 
behaviour, their artefacts, and their violence – that he does not understand, not cause and 
effect per se.   
Clark (2009) goes even further in his interpretation of the Neanderthals in The 
Inheritors.  In an extension of Hoover’s (1999) work, he looks specifically at what the 
language of the text allows readers to infer about them and finds, significantly, that we are 
invited to believe their system of communication is not simple but highly complex (192).  
Consider, for example, the scene where the people discover that their normal means of 
crossing the river, a fallen log, has disappeared (13). As the people discuss their dilemma, the 
narrator reports that Fa questions Ha, and that Ha “answered her with his mouth” (13). 
As Clark (2009: 192) notes with reference to Hoover’s (1999: 4) Gricean (1975: 45, 49) 
account of this scene, our ordinary assumption is that we talk with our mouths, so to be told 
“Ha answered her with his mouth” is over informative for the circumstance and thus a flout 
of quantity. This leads us to search for an interpretation, a reason for why we are being over 
informed, and an available interpretation is that the Neanderthal characters “communicate 
nonverbally or even telepathically” (Clark 2009: 192, drawing on Hoover 1999: 4-5). 
Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor (1967) also arrive at the interpretation of telepathy, but for them 
it is a kind of cognitive crutch, a thing the Neanderthal characters do because they find 
complex verbalisations difficult (73).  For Clark (2009: 194), however, something more 
complex is going on: whatever the nature of Fa’s unspoken question in the log scene above, 
Ha’s response allows us to infer a great deal.  We can conclude, for example, ‘[t]hat the 
question was very specific, expecting an answer about a duration of time measured in days, 
and that [Ha] understood exactly what this fairly precise question was” (Clark 2009: 194).  
For Clark (2009), the fact that the Neanderthal dialogue is sometimes difficult to understand 
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is not necessarily evidence of their simplicity.  Instead, he turns this assumption on its head, 
concluding that the deficit may be in us. 
We are missing out on something which they possess in their ability to communicate so effectively 
without words (2009: 194, italics mine). 
Just because we do not fully understand the Neanderthal language as represented in the text 
does not necessarily mean it is simple or undeveloped.   That we find the Neanderthal 
characters difficult to understand may be our failure to listen, not their failure to 
communicate. 
 Inspired by these more “constructionist” (Stamou 2014: 122) accounts of linguistic 
variation in The Inheritors, my aim in this paper is to demonstrate that the Neanderthal 
dialogue in the text is not restricted or limited as Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor (1967: 71) 
have claimed but alive with meaning, and that the Neanderthal characters emerge as 
accomplished negotiators of those meanings.  To do this, I extend Clark’s (2009) inferential 
analysis by applying theory of mind and intentionality as analytical tools in a sociopragmatic 
investigation of the Neanderthal speech in the novel, moving outside the ‘normal’ range of 
applied theory in pragmatic stylistics in order to ‘listen’ more closely to the Neanderthal 
characters.  Paying particular attention to Lok and his people as they express their religious 
beliefs, tell stories, and argue with each other during personal conflicts, I arrive at a fresh 
understanding of the mental, emotional, and social worlds we are invited to imagine for them. 
In particular, I argue that 1) readers are invited to infer that the Neanderthals are themselves 
inferring beings who can be read not only as having theory of mind but also advanced orders 
of intentionality; and 2) that this interpretation has implications not only for individual 
readings of the novel, but also for how The Inheritors as a cultural text operates in our 
continually evolving relationship with the figure of the Neanderthal.      
3 Methodological issues 
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As noted above, I am using theory of mind and intentionality in this investigation to 
demonstrate that the Neanderthal characters in The Inheritors can be read as making 
inferences in much the same way we do. Since applying theory of mind and intentionality 
takes us off the beaten path in pragmatic stylistics, it will be useful to explain what they are 
and how they relate to inference, and why they can be considered legitimate as tools of 
analysis in the interpretation of fiction.  
3.1 Intentionality, Theory of Mind, and Inference 
Understanding what people say to us or what we read often involves us in making 
inferences, working out what is meant when this is frequently different from what is actually 
said or written (explanation after Leech and Short 2007: 236; Wales 1990: 248).  Our ability 
to make such inferences, as Dunbar (2004) notes in his account of human social and cognitive 
evolution, entails what is called theory of mind and this, in turn, requires a sufficiently 
advanced state of intentionality.  To clarify these terms, I will follow Dunbar’s (2004) 
account, starting with intentionality.  Intentionality, as Dunbar (2004: 45) explains, is a 
concept from philosophy that refers to mental self-awareness, our knowledge that we have 
minds and that our minds contain our thoughts.  This kind of knowledge can be classified into 
a series of “orders” (Dunbar 2004: 45).  At zero order we might, as Dunbar (2004) suggests, 
think of a computer, a machine that stores and manipulates information without any 
awareness that it does so (45).  At first order, knowing one’s own mind (I am tired; I am 
nervous) becomes possible (45). It is at second order that theory of mind develops (44). At 
this stage, we are not only aware of our own minds, but become aware that other people have 
minds as well.  With this comes the ability to imagine someone else’s point of view and to 
infer from this what they might be thinking (43-44). Thus, at the second order of 
intentionality, we can have beliefs about what someone else believes (Jane believes her 
husband thinks their new car was a waste of money). As the orders of intentionality increase, 
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so do the required powers of imagination and inference.  At third order, we are able to keep 
track of three states of belief (I think that Molly believes that Karen wants to cancel the 
meeting) (44-45).  With orders four and five, we can engage in more complex and shared 
imaginative experiences, such as understanding and telling stories (162-3), creating and 
interpreting literature (120-121), and participating in communal religion (168-9,185).  
3.2 Intentionality and Theory of Mind in the Analysis of Fiction 
Having defined intentionality and theory of mind, we can now turn our attention to 
the second methodological issue, establishing that they are appropriately applied in the 
analysis of fiction.  Towards this end, I will demonstrate here that they are a good fit with 
other analytical frameworks that have been thus applied in the study of represented talk, that 
the orders of intentionality lend themselves to the process of systematic classification, and 
that their representation in fiction exists as a stylistic choice.  
3.2.1 A Good Fit 
As Herman (1995: 6) notes with respect to drama dialogue, actual talk and 
represented talk have an interesting relationship.  While it is clear that they are different, it is 
nevertheless the case that 
 the principles, norms and conventions of use which underlie spontaneous communication in everyday 
 life are precisely those which are exploited and manipulated by dramatists in their constructions of  
speech types and forms in plays (Herman 1995: 6). 
This means that  
 ‘ordinary speech’ or, more accurately, the ‘rules’ underlying ordinary and meaningful exchange of  
 speech in everyday contexts are the resource that dramatists use to construct dialogue in plays (Herman  
1995: 6). 
Herman’s (1995) insights about drama dialogue apply equally well to fiction and fictional 
dialogue.  As Fowler (1977) has noted, fiction presents us with what are essentially 
represented minds, narrators and characters portrayed as having thoughts and beliefs which 
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motivate particular behaviours, including linguistic behaviours.  We understand these minds, 
as many analysts point out, with reference to our own minds, intuitively comparing what they 
think and say with what we would think and say in the same circumstances (Nuttall 2015; 
Leech and Short 2007; Zunshine 2003: 273; Herman 1995; Burton 1980; Culpeper 2001; 
Dunbar 2004: 66, 120). Thus, in the same way that the “principles, norms and conventions of 
use which underlie spontaneous communication in everyday life” are a “resource” for writers 
of fiction and drama, they are also a resource for readers of those texts (Herman 1995: 6). In 
order to better understand how this works, studies in pragmatic stylistics (e.g. see Nuttall 
2015; Gregoriou 2009; Leech and Short 2007; Culpeper 2001; Culpeper et al., eds. 1998 and 
the papers therein; Short 1996; Herman 1995) frequently draw on frameworks that have been 
devised to specify just what these “principles, norms and conventions of use” (Herman 1995: 
6) might be and how they might operate. Such frameworks include speech act theory (Austin 
1962; Searle 1969), which seeks to explain how we understand the intended purpose of 
utterances, their illocutionary force, when the actual linguistic form of the utterance may or 
may not make this clear, and sets out to systematically define a range of speech acts (promise, 
invite, request, etc.) in relation to a set of social and psychological criteria; politeness theory 
(Brown and Levinson 1987), which invokes the mutual need to maintain face to account for 
how and why we often diverge from maximally clear and efficient communication; and the 
Cooperative Principle (Grice 1975), developed to explain how we so frequently and 
accurately manage to understand what others imply rather than state.  Theory of mind and 
intentionality, also devised to shed light on human cognitive behaviour, are a good fit with 
these frameworks, particularly as they are also concerned with the role of inference in 
everyday language. As Dunbar (2004) suggests, theory of mind and the higher orders of 
intentionality seem fundamental to the business of talk, since in order to have conversations 
we  have to operate with some fairly sophisticated hypotheses about what our interlocutors 
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actually mean, and what they are likely to understand by what we ourselves say (2004: 119-
120).  Consider as well that Dunbar’s (2004) own account, while concerned primarily with 
human evolution, suggests a role for textual analysis. Using Shakespeare’s Othello to 
illustrate the orders of intentionality, he slides into interpretation, noting that it is the 
audience’s understanding of Iago’s intentions “that makes the play work” (Dunbar 2004: 
120). 
 As Herman (1995: 8) also points out, represented talk can confirm what we expect 
from natural talk, or diverge from this, but in either case there are implications for 
interpretation. In Valerie Lowe’s (1998) work on Arthur Miller’s The Crucible, it is 
divergence that is at issue.  Citing reader “unease” (133) at the point in the play when 
Reverend Hale declares that Tituba, a slave, has confessed to witchcraft, Lowe (1998) draws 
on Austin’s (1962) to argue that Tituba’s utterance cannot legitimately count as such, and 
suggests that it is the mismatch between Hale’s interpretation of Tituba’s speech and ours that 
drives the sense of injustice that emerges from the text.  Here, by contrast, I demonstrate that 
it is a correspondence with our expectations that is meaningful.  Using theory of mind and 
intentionality as analytical devices, I argue that the Neanderthal dialogue in The Inheritors 
shows us characters who make inferences about what their interlocutors mean in broadly the 
same way we would.    
 3.2.2 Suitable Units 
In addition to being a good theoretical fit, theory of mind and intentionality also 
provide a suitable unit of analysis, the orders of intentionality.  Expressible in mental process 
verbs (believe, think), the orders are discrete and countable (first order, second order, etc.) 
and give us a powerful way of systematically classifying the inferencing powers of the 
represented minds we find in fiction.  In addition, they are also suitable for comparative 
purposes.  Applying the orders as Dunbar (2004) outlines them, we have a baseline, the zero 
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order; a norm, and an “upper limit” (46).  Generally speaking, as Dunbar (2004) notes, “most 
everyday situations probably require no more than second order intentionality” (46), and the 
story comprehension tests he and colleagues conducted with university students revealed that 
the majority in the sample handled “any given order up to fifth order” correctly (47), 
suggesting that “in actual practice, the limit for most people is probably about fourth or fifth 
order” (47).   
3.2.3 Available as a Choice 
The final test of whether theory of mind and intentionality are appropriate additions to 
our analytical arsenal, however, is whether their reflections in fictional texts occur as choices. 
As Dunbar (2004) points out, our own mental states and abilities can be so natural to us that it 
can be difficult to think beyond them (see also Zunshine 2003: 272).  This means that if we 
determine a fictional character has, along with other represented traits, theory of mind, we 
have to ask if that is represented as a choice, or whether it emerges simply because it may be 
difficult to create character without it.  If theory of mind is available as a choice for 
representation, then we should be able to instance examples of characters that are represented 
without it, and this does seem to be possible. As Dunbar (2004: 44, 68, 76, 170) suggests, our 
powers to imagine the world as different from the way we find it are limited without theory 
of mind, and the character of Benjy in Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury has often been 
described in this way.  In their analysis of the opening of this text where we eventually realise 
that Benjy is watching a game of golf, Leech and Short (2007), for example, note that 
“Benjy’s world appears to be a simple and concrete one” (164) characterised by a failure to 
understand the intentions of others: “he appears to perceive no purpose in the golfer’s 
actions” (165). In Benjy then, we appear to have a character at first order, aware that he 
perceives but unable to imagine what others might perceive.  
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Another example comes from The Inheritors itself.  As Clark (2009: 185)) notes, the 
novel is typically described as having three parts.  In between the first part of the novel, 
which gives the Neanderthal perspective, and the final part, which gives the modern human 
perspective, there is a section in which 
the narrator’s voice is that of a detached, quasi-scientific observer.  He is apparently unaware of the  
preceding action, so that the significance of his observations is lost upon him.  The narrator reports: the 
reader derives the implicatures’ (Black 1993: 38).    
This distanced and seemingly disembodied narrator would seem to be at first order,   
describing what it observes but seemingly unaware of the implications of those observations, 
or even zero order, simply recording and ‘playing back’ information. 
4 Analysis 
 Having defined theory of mind and intentionality and made the case for their use as 
analytical categories, we can now move on to the analysis and its implications.  As noted 
earlier, much of the previous work on The Inheritors (Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 1967; 
Adriaens 1970; Halliday 1971; Nelson 1986; Black 1993) concluded that the Neanderthal 
characters had only limited powers of cognition and understood the world primarily “through 
their senses” (Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 1967: 48), remaining tied to the physical world in 
a  perpetual present.  Such findings would seem to indicate a largely first order awareness 
without theory of mind (Lok’s I have a picture, 33; Liku’s I am hungry, 21), suggesting that 
the Neanderthal characters remain trapped in a juvenile state of cognition. “Without theory of 
mind,” as Dunbar (2004) reminds us, we “take the world exactly as it comes” (51), unable to 
“imagine that it could be other than what [we] perceive it to be” (44).  As I will show here, 
however, the Neanderthal characters go well beyond this.  Paying careful attention to their 
talk as they express religious their religious beliefs, tell stories, and engage in complex 
interpersonal conflicts, I will demonstrate that these interchanges invite us to conclude that 
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the Neanderthal characters are possessed of powerful imaginations and have the ability to 
make sophisticated inferences about each other’s beliefs and intentions.  
4.1 Expressing Religious Beliefs 
 To say that the Neanderthals are represented as having religious beliefs is not new, as 
most of the accounts discussed earlier acknowledge their belief in Oa, their mother goddess.  
Less discussed in previous work on The Inheritors, however, is how these beliefs are 
expressed in their dialogue and the implications this has for what we can infer about their 
powers of inference.  Consider the following four scenes where their religious beliefs become 
apparent in their talk. For ease of reference, I have named them.  In the first scene, the 
creation scene, Mal recites the story of how the Oa created them and the earth (35).  
In the second scene, the intercession, the old woman decides that Fa must ask Oa for help in 
healing Mal (70). In the third scene, the doe scene, Lok reacts with guilt to their butchering 
activities (54). In the fourth scene, the fire scene, Mal addresses the old woman as she 
prepares to cross the river with the lit embers they use to re-start their fire (19). What do such 
scenes allow us to infer about the cognitive powers of the Neanderthal characters?  Firstly, in 
order to believe in their Oa at all, their concept of the world must extend beyond what they 
can physically perceive (see Dunbar 2004: 184), and there are many other examples in their 
dialogue that indicate this.  When Mal dies and they bury him, it is clear that this is not 
simply a physical act; for them, it means “Oa has taken Mal into her belly” (91). As they 
walk through their landscape, the ice is not just ice, but a reflection of their Oa (28, 70), and 
the earth is not just dirt beneath their feet but the child of their goddess “brought forth . . . 
from her belly” (35).  Similarly, the tree root Liku carries is not just a tree root: it is “the little 
Oa” (33) (discussed further below, see section 4.2). When the old woman carries their lit 
embers over the river, it is clear from their talk that she is not just an old woman at this 
particularly dangerous moment (if she falls in the river both she and the embers are at risk), 
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and the lit embers are more than a mechanism to re-igniting their fire.  In this scene, Mal 
directly addresses the old woman in the third person with she (“Will she carry it across 
now?”, 19)encoding extreme deference (after Brown and Levinson 1987: 198-201), and 
refers to the fire only indirectly as it. Significantly, both uses are represented as systematic 
divergences from their ‘normal’ talk. She in direct address is used only with the old woman 
here, as in the very next interchange he addresses Liku with the unmarked 2nd person you, and 
later dialogue indicates that they do have a word for fire which they readily use during the 
course of their normal activities (Let her stay by the fire, 46;).  So what do the pronouns she 
and it tell us here?  In Gricean (1975: 45-46, 49) terms, they are flouts of manner and 
quantity, she being mysteriously formal here and it being under informative.  These flouts 
send us off on a journey of interpretation (Grice 1975: 49-50) and an available conclusion in 
context is that the old woman, as their matriarch and fire-guardian, is not just the old woman 
but an instantiation of their goddess and the embers are not just live coals but sacred objects 
too precious to be mentioned.  
As these instances clearly show, the Neanderthal characters believe in a world beyond 
the one they can see and hear and smell.  Drawing on Dunbar’s (2004) account, this allows us 
to infer that they have second order intentionality (184).  From their talk on religious matters, 
however, it is also possible to infer that they go substantially beyond this.  Consider the 
concession scene again. In order to get Fa to pray for Mal, the old woman must have beliefs 
about what Fa believes and about what their Oa believes and this involves several instances 
of second order intentionality.  The old woman must believe [1] that Fa will believe [2] in her 
authority; the old woman must believe [1] that Fa wants [2] to help Mal; and she must also 
think [1] that the Oa will understand [2] their request (here and throughout, I adopt Dunbar’s 
notation to trace chains of belief).  As the dialogue clearly implies, however, their religion is 
not just a matter of what they each believe, but what they all believe and assume each other to 
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believe and this makes things even more complex.  For instance, the old woman must believe 
[1] that Fa thinks [2] that she (the old woman) believes [3] that the Oa will understand [4] 
that Mal needs help, which is four orders.  Because their religious beliefs are mutually held, 
complex chains of inference are implied for Fa here, as well.  Fa must believe [1] that the old 
woman believes [2] that she (Fa) believes [3] that the Oa will understand [4] Mal needs help. 
The doe scene and the creation scene provide similar examples of this type. In order to feel 
guilt in the doe scene, Lok must believe [1] that the Oa will think [2] he is doing something 
wrong.  In order for him to blame it on the cat, he must be operating at three orders: Lok must 
think [1] that the Oa will accept [2] that he believes [3] it was the cat’s fault.  In order to tell 
the creation story with authenticity, which he does, Mal must intend [1] for the others to 
believe [2] that he believes [3] the Oa created them and their world.  And if we assume, as is 
likely, that he is telling the story not just for their benefit but to honour and influence the Oa, 
we have five orders: Mal must think [1] that the others will believe [2] that he believes [3] the 
Oa will understand [4] that they want [5] her to care for them. 
4.2 Telling Stories 
 As just demonstrated, some of the Neanderthal dialogue in The Inheritors focuses on 
their religious beliefs and practices, and as we tune into this talk we become increasingly 
aware that it suggests the Neanderthals have theory of mind and sophisticated inferencing 
abilities. This becomes even more apparent when we consider Neanderthal storytelling in the 
novel.  As an example, let us join Lok as he tells the story of finding a tree root that he thinks 
looks like their Oa, and giving it to Liku as a gift (33). When Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 
(1967) discuss the style of this scene they say only that “Lok’s words in the passage are little 
more than verbal accompaniment of mime and gesture” (72).  In the analysis here, however, I 
suggest Lok’s language achieves something far more profound: in this story Lok uses 
language “as ‘speech style’, as a resource for meaning making in context” (Stamou 2014: 
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122, with reference to Coupland 2007).  It is evident, for example, that Lok is not simply 
narrating these events to convey information, as everyone knows the story already (They 
knew it as well as he did, 33).  Instead, the story clearly has a bonding function.  Applying 
work from Bowles (2010) on conversational storytelling, we can say here that Lok’s story 
works to “construct affiliation” (Bowles 2010: 150).  Everyone enjoys listening to it again, 
they laugh, and in the very next scene they fall into one of their shared silences (34).  It can 
also be suggested, again with reference to Bowles (2009: 58), that Lok is using the story to 
project his identity as the group’s master storyteller and comic entertainer.  Applying work on 
conversation analysis (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974) and represented conversational 
storytelling (Bowles 2009, 2010) to this scene allows us to take a more detailed look at the 
ways in which Lok does this.  Notice first of all that features of recipient design (Sacks, 
Schegloff and Jefferson 1974: 727) and involvement (Brown and Levinson 1987: 106-107) 
accumulate in the story as Lok actively engages his audience.  He starts by bidding for a long 
turn, introducing his story with I have a picture (33).  Throughout the tale, he uses repetition 
to build suspense (I have a picture; a picture of finding the little Oa; I feel; with this foot I 
feel, 33).  The repetition of feel culminates in an audience-involving rhetorical question 
(What do I feel?, 33) to which Lok supplies three possible answers in parallel (A bulb? A 
stick? A bone?, 33), heightening the suspense further.  The use of the historic present and 
present progressive (am standing; feel; is, 33) animates the story for the audience (Brown and 
Levinson 1987: 106-107), as do the performative elements.  The narrative reports emphasis 
Lok’s deliberate miming as he re-enacts the scene for his audience (His weight was on his left 
foot. . . ; His right foot seized something, 33), and the pauses, obvious in the text (33),are 
salient, co-occurring with the repetition to add dramatic effect.  
 For the story to operate as a bonding mechanism for the group and identity projection 
for Lok, both he and his audience have to understand the story and appreciate its wider social 
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meanings, and this allows us to infer that both he and his audience must have theory of mind 
and must also be able to operate at the higher orders of intentionality, as well. As the 
storyteller, Lok must want [1] his audience to believe [2] that Liku thinks [3] he is a great 
hero for finding her such a miraculous gift, which is three orders of intentionality. Lok’s 
listeners are working at four orders.  They understand [1] that Lok wants [2] them to believe 
[3] that Liku believes [4] he is a great hero.  
The specific elements of recipient design in Lok’s story are a further indication that 
the Neanderthal characters have theory of mind. They allow us to infer, for instance, that Lok 
must be keenly aware of his audience.  In order to involve his listeners by using repetition, 
rhetorical questions, and animating devices such as mime, gesture and strategic pausing, he 
must have the ability to hypothesize how they are likely to react, and this requires second 
order intentionality (see Dunbar 2004: 119): Lok intends [1] for his audience to find [2] that 
he is entertaining. Working at three orders, the audience do seem to ratify his belief. At the 
end of the story, the others applaud, and Lok is “secure in their applause” (33), an indication 
that the audience endorses the story’s value, its “tellability” (Bowles 2010: 19, 68), and by 
extension Lok’s status as a storyteller and entertainer: they intend [1] for Lok to believe [2] 
that they think [3] he is funny.  
 As just shown, “Lok’s words” here are far more than a simple “accompaniment of 
mime and gesture” (Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 1967: 72).  They represent an instance of 
storytelling and in so doing show us characters who, in order to tell and understand those 
stories, must have cognitive abilities similar to our own, for as many commentators have 
noted, storytelling is, after all, quintessentially human behaviour (Black 2006: 53; Dunbar 
2004: 163).  
4.3 Arguing and Interpersonal Conflicts 
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 Thus far, I have demonstrated with respect to their religious talk and storytelling that 
the Neanderthal dialogue in The Inheritors shows us not simple and primitive creatures of 
limited intelligence, but beings with theory of mind and substantial inferential powers.  Their 
cognitive capacities are underlined even further when we eavesdrop on the Neanderthals as 
they engage in another very human behaviour, squabbles and arguments that sometimes 
become bad-tempered.  While a number of commentators suggest that the Neanderthals in 
The Inheritors have yet to develop a ‘higher consciousness’ (Nelson 1986: 307), show little 
sense of self (Black 1993: 44; Walker 1981: 300), and generally lack the capacity for 
introspection (Black 1993: 44), I show here that their dialogue invites us to see them as 
thoughtful and highly reflective individual selves who engage in “moment-to-moment 
negotiation and projection of identities in discursive social action” (Stamou 2014: 122).  I 
will illustrate this with examples from three scenes which show the Neanderthals engaging in 
complex social interactions that require careful and accurate deductions about the beliefs and 
intentions of their interlocutors. The first scene to be considered is when Mal has fallen ill 
with a fever and proposes to send Lok, Fa, and Liku out to gather food. Fa and Lok disagree, 
with Fa suggesting that Liku should not accompany them, and Lok suggesting that they 
follow Mal’s instruction (46).  Interesting in this scene is that Lok and Fa clearly engage in 
the complex activity of debating what their next course of action should be, which entails 
several orders of intentionality.  Fa, operating at second order, makes it clear she has beliefs 
about Mal’s beliefs: she believes [1] that Mal believes [2] Liku should join them in gathering 
food.  Notice as well, however, that she considers that belief to be false (It is not good that 
Liku should come out on the plain with us, 46), one of the hallmarks of theory of mind.  
When we develop theory of mind, we are not only able to imagine what others might believe, 
but also understand that those beliefs might be false (Dunbar 2004: 68).  Also significant in 
this stretch of dialogue is that it shows us Fa clearly understand cause and effect: Fa believes 
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that Mal has a false belief because he is ill.  Acting on this belief, she attempts to influence 
Lok, projecting her identity as leader and chief planner now that Mal is ill.  In this, she 
demonstrates three orders of intentionality: Fa wants [1] Lok to understand [3] that she thinks 
[3] Mal’s plan is a mistake. Lok disagrees, challenging Fa’s claim to authority in the 
deceptively simple Mal said and displaying four orders of intentionality as he does so. In 
order to disagree, Lok has to understand [1] that Fa wants [2] him to believe [3] that she 
believes [4] Mal’s plan is ill-advised.  
 For the second scene, we return to the episode where the people discover their log 
bridge is missing (12). Fa and Lok again find themselves in disagreement and once again the 
issue at stake is identity, this time Lok’s identity as the group’s comedian. When Lok tells Fa 
of the missing log, she looks “accusingly” (12) at Lok, who immediately denies that he 
moved the log as joke (12). In order to call into question Lok’s value as the group’s practical 
joker, Fas has to be working at three orders of intentionality.  She has to believe [1] that Lok 
believes [2] the people will think [3] it is funny if he moves the log, and as the dialogue 
makes clear, she assumes at first that this is what must have happened. Demonstrating his 
own ability to understand that others can have false beliefs, Lok protests his innocence and 
re-asserts his value as the initiator of play, calling Fa out on her accusation.  Notice that the 
accusation is something that Lok works out for himself (Fa “did not need to speak”, 12), and 
that in his talk, he responds to what he thinks Fa believes, not what she says. Significantly, 
this requires the scale-topping sixth order of intentionality (remember that Dunbar’s 
university students only scored accurately up to five) – not bad for the character that is 
generally considered to be “not particularly intelligent” (Hoover 1999: 4).  Lok understands 
[1] that Fa wants [2] him to believe [3] that she thinks [4] it was wrong of him to think [5] the 
people would think [5] it was funny if he moved the log.  Also worth pointing out here is that 
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this scene allows us to infer Lok’s belief in his own agency, as he clearly believes he could 
have moved the log if he had wished to. 
 The final scene to be considered is when Fa settles a dispute between Ha and Lok.  As 
in the previous two scenes, identity work comes to the fore.  As Lok begins telling the group 
another story to entertain them, Ha steals his thunder by casting doubt on some of the details 
(38).  In doing this Ha, generally the sensible and dependable one (13) -- it is he who finds a 
new log for their bridge, and he who has to wade into the icy water to place it (16-18) – 
asserts this identity during Lok’s story by challenging Lok’s identity as their comedian.  
Returning to conversational storytelling, we can say here that that the story is not simply a 
narrated sequence of events but a space in which to contest status (Bowles 2010: 145).  Ha 
challenges the “tellability” (Bowles 2010: 19, 68) of Lok’s story, and thus Lok’s status as the 
teller, by stealing his audience and ridiculing him. This requires Ha to be operating at three 
orders of intentionality.  Ha intends [1] the people to believe [2] that he is superior to Lok 
because he thinks [3] that Lok’s story is a silly exaggeration. Lok once again understands the 
challenge to his identity, as is clear in his signs of annoyance.  In response to Ha’s “cynical 
smile” (38), his hair raises, he blusters, he begins to “gibber” (38) and he protests with “That 
is a true picture!” (38). Notice once again that his protest here is made in response to what he 
believes Ha thinks, not in reply to anything Ha has said. Lok understands [1] that Ha intends 
[2] for the people to believe [3] that he (Ha) thinks [4] Lok is exaggerating, and Lok fears [1] 
the people will believe [2] Ha’s belief [3] that he is exaggerating. Fa, again projecting the 
identity of leader, steps in to make peace.  This implies some very complex processing on her 
part. In order to make her contribution to the talk, she has to notice what is going on, 
understand what Lok thinks, understand what Ha thinks, understand what Ha thinks Lok will 
think, understand what Lok thinks Ha thinks, and understand what they both think the people 
will think.  In addition, she has to compute the implications arising from the dispute, the risk 
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to the group’s harmony if the conflict escalates.  Tracing the orders of intentionality involved, 
Fa understands [1] that Ha wants [2] the people to believe [3] that he is superior because he 
thinks [4] that Lok’s story is silly (four orders), and she also understands [1] that Lok fears 
[2] the people will believe [3] Ha’s belief [4] that he is exaggerating (three more orders).  In 
addition to what she understands about Ha and Lok, she has her own intentions here.  To 
diffuse the tension, she wants [1] the people to see [2] that she believes [3] that Ha and Lok 
each have their particular talents (and perhaps are as silly as each other) (three more orders).  
It is unclear whether we should see this as ten orders of intentionality or three parallel sets of 
inferences involving four, three and three orders respectively, but in either case it is clear that 
we are invited to see Fa as a character invested with a powerful emotional intelligence.  
5 Conclusion and Implications 
 As demonstrated in the preceding analysis, the Neanderthals in The Inheritors are 
perhaps not, as much of the previous work on this text has supposed, represented as simple 
and primitive creatures surviving more on instinct than intelligence.  In their religious 
practices, their storytelling and their interpersonal exchanges, they are represented as 
demonstrating cognitive abilities akin to our own, working routinely at the second, third and 
fourth orders of intentionality and occasionally going beyond this.  We come now to the final 
part of the discussion, what this re-reading means for The Inheritors as a cultural text.  While 
it might be considered that the novel is just one single imagining of the human/Neanderthal 
encounter, I demonstrate here that its implications are much wider than this.  Like a stone 
dropped in a river, the effects of the text ripple outward and intersect with other currents of 
thought. For this discussion, I will be drawing on some of Bakhtin’s (1981) ideas from his 
essay ‘Discourse in the Novel’.  These ideas are that 1) the utterance behaves like a living 
thing, “an active participant in social dialogue” that “cannot fail to brush up against 
thousands of living dialogic threads” (276); and 2) an “artistic work” (274) like a novel is not 
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a self-contained and finished thing, but a “rejoinder” (274) in active contact with other 
“living rhetorical genres” (269).  
If we consider The Inheritors to be an utterance in this wider sense, it becomes 
interesting to look at some of the many “living dialogic threads’ it ‘brush[es] up against” 
(276).  Three of these threads are the historic/scientific record on our encounter with the 
Neanderthal, the academic literature on The Inheritors, and the genre of prehistoric fiction.  
As Hackett and Dennell (2003) and Trinkhaus and Shipman (1994) point out, the scientific 
account on our encounter with the Neanderthal is at times more story than science.  As 
Trinkhaus and Shipman’s (1994) account suggests, two competing discourses on the figure of 
the Neanderthal have developed since their Neanderthal bones were first recognised in 1856,  
one holding that the Neanderthals were subhuman brutes closer to the apes than to us, and the 
other that the Neanderthals were members of the human family to be accepted and embraced 
as such (Trinkhaus and Shipman 1994). The Inheritors has played, and continues to play, an 
active role in the dialogue between these two discourses.  For some, the novel is a “rejoinder” 
(Bakhtin 1981: 274) to Wells.  As Clark (2009: 197), Elsbree (1999: 234) and Ruddick (2009: 
76) have all pointed out, the novel’s epigraph, a quote from Outline of History on the 
supposed animalistic nature of the Neanderthal, invites the interpretation that The Inheritors 
can be cast as a response or a rebuttal to that view. For others, The Inheritors as a piece of 
prehistoric fiction plays another very active role in the discourse on the status of the 
Neanderthal.  As Hackett and Dennell (2003) have noted, both literary and scientific 
imaginations have a role to play in the story of how we understand the Neanderthal. 
According to this view, prehistoric fiction can serve as an active and productive space of 
speculation, a place to raise and consider hypotheses with considerably more freedom than is 
afforded to scientific genres (Hackett and Dennell 2003: 817; Timmons 1996: 399-400).  As 
Hackett and Dennell (2003) also note, prehistoric fiction such as The Inheritors can often 
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intersect in a more direct way with the public conversation about our deep “archaeological 
past” than scientific writing (817).   
Another set of voices in the dialogue on our encounter with the Neanderthal is the 
academic literature on The Inheritors.  Many of the earlier studies I have discussed here 
(Adriaens 1970; Halliday 1971; Nelson 1986; Black 1993) saw in the novel a reflection of the 
Neanderthal-as-primitive discourse while later studies such as Hoover (1999) and Clark 
(2009) saw in this very same text challenges to that discourse.  The re-reading offered here in 
this paper takes this challenge to the next level by listening to the Neanderthals in The 
Inheritors in a new way and suggesting a cognitively richer mental world for them, one much 
like our own.  This trajectory in the academic record on The Inheritors puts it in parallel with 
the scientific record on the Neanderthal.  As Trinkhaus and Shipman’s (1994) account 
indicates, the direction of travel has, with many stops, starts, reversals, and upsets along the 
way, been generally towards humanising the Neanderthal, and subsequent evidence has 
served to reinforce this view.  Dunbar (2004), for example, notes that studies on Neanderthal 
brain size indicate that they might have been able to handle fourth or fifth order intentionality 
(75), and suggests that they “might not have been the intellectual slouches of common myth” 
(75).  It appears, however, that our conversation on the Neanderthal is far from finished. The 
most recent findings are emerging from genetic studies and it has recently been discovered 
that non-Africans have Neanderthal DNA (Robin Mckie reporting on the work of geneticist 
Svante Pääbo and his team in The Observer, 2010).  Such findings seem to have disrupted the 
emerging consensus of the Neanderthal as human, and appear to be taking our conversation 
on our relationship with them in a new direction.  Current interest, for example, seems to 
cluster around the consequences of interbreeding. Some report that it weakened our immune 
system (Tom Whipple on the work of Professor Luis Barriero in The Times, 2016), others 
that interbreeding made us stronger (Padraic Flanagan on a study in Molecular Biology and 
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Evolution in the i, 2016), and on the conversation goes.  It will be interesting to see how 
future academic work on The Inheritors responds to this next chapter in the 
human/Neanderthal story, and what future analysts will hear in the Neanderthal dialogue.       
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